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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
**Newport, R.I.**

**Joint Military Operations Paper:**

*Krayola Khans: An analysis of U.S. Operational Commanders and Indigenous Warlords*

By

Colonel William F. Roy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

09 May 2006



## **ABSTRACT**

This paper seeks to answer a question posed by the NWC faculty in their February 2006 Joint Military Operations Research Paper Guidance Memorandum: “Based on U.S. military experience during the past five years, define and defend the tenets that a U.S. operational commander should employ when dealing with indigenous warlords during complex OOTW missions.”

To answer this question, the author proposes that our experiences in MOOTW, both past and present, require the operational commander to employ the tenets of center of gravity, leverage, and termination in dealing with indigenous warlords. By looking at our past experience in Somalia, as well as current operations in Afghanistan, the influence of sub-national actors—warlords—can have a devastating impact on the operational commander’s mission and the overall U.S. desired end state. Looking first towards conflict termination, the operational commander must determine how the warlord plays into the mission of bringing stability to the region. Once that decision is made, he must then analyze the warlord’s center of gravity—his militia. Finally, he must place leverage against the warlord’s critical vulnerability in order to achieve the operational objective: initial security in order to develop long-term stability.

Given the current environment in today’s War on Terrorism, the U.S. military will continue to be tasked to conduct MOOTW in failed and failing states. Warlords, defined as sub-national actors, will most certainly be a part of those scenarios. Our lessons in Somalia and Afghanistan make it imperative that we build upon our experiences and expand our doctrine to deal with indigenous warlords.

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***Introduction***

During the conduct of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) the Joint Force Commander is presented with a number of unique challenges in his mission to bring stability to the area of operations.<sup>1</sup> This paper will focus on one of these unique challenges: indigenous warlords.

In order to track events taking place throughout the battle-space, the U.S. military uses a system called the Common Operation Picture (COP). An integral part of the COP is a color code system used to identify combatants, non-combatants, and civilians. For example, the color blue indicates friendly military forces; green is used for indigenous forces that are considered to be neutral; white is for civilians; and the color red identifies those who are considered hostile.<sup>2</sup> However, by using these definitions and their associated color scheme, how does a Joint Force Commander (JFC) code an indigenous warlord (such as an Afghan khan) whose forces may, at any given point and on any given day, fall into any or all four categories? Hence the title of this paper: “The Krayola Khans.” This is a dilemma that has haunted JFCs in the past and continues to plague them today as they seek to bring order to chaos in troubled lands.

Although the term “warlord” is pejorative, a JFC does not have the luxury of dismissing or eliminating these sub-national actors based upon an intentionally provocative title. As with other aspects of the battle-space, he must analyze the challenges they present and take appropriate actions. Today’s facets of Joint Operational Art provide useful and already familiar tools with which to do so, most notably in regards to center of gravity, leverage, and termination.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, in the course of this paper the author will seek to

answer the Naval War College's salient question: "Based on U.S. military experience during the past five years, define and defend the tenets that an operational commander should employ when dealing with indigenous warlords during complex OOTW missions," by offering the following answer: ***an operational commander should employ the facets of center of gravity, leverage, and termination when dealing with indigenous warlords during complex MOOTW missions.***

To support this thesis, the reader will first be provided with an *historical background* of how warlords have disrupted the JFC's operational objective during a past conflict. Second, the reader will be provided with a biographical sketch of three separate men who represent the full spectrum of the *types of warlords* JFCs face in today's environment. Lastly, with those examples in hand, the reader will be *introduced to the concept* of how JFCs can use the facets of center of gravity (COG), leverage, and termination to bring about a successful conclusion when dealing with indigenous warlords.

### ***Warlord defined***

Before beginning an analysis of indigenous warlords, it is important to define what exactly the author means when referring to the term "**warlord.**" In the context of this paper it means "one who has de facto military control of a sub-national area, due to a military force which is personally obedient to [him]." <sup>4</sup> This definition will provide the framework to address the challenges presented by warlords across the full spectrum of MOOTW: from men like Somalia's General Mohammad Aidid to Afghanistan's Marshal Fahim Khan. While there may be a great disparity between their motives and means, they nonetheless create a challenge to the JFC's operational objective: security and stability in the region.

***Historical Background:***

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia stands out in recent memory as an example of the U.S. military's difficulty in dealing with indigenous warlords. Although initially a UN peacekeeping mission designed to provide food for starving Somalis who had been ravaged by clashes between rival warlords, the U.S. JFC quickly found himself in the middle of a war zone.<sup>5</sup> In June 1993 men aligned to one of the Somali warlords, General Mohammad Aidid, ambushed and killed a group of UN soldiers. Shortly thereafter Aidid became a wanted man. When U.S. forces sought to capture him and his lieutenants the mission ended in a bloody battle best captured in Mark Bowden's book *Black Hawk Down*.<sup>6</sup> Although the mission in Somalia is greatly different from that of Afghanistan and Iraq, the inability of JFCs to deal with indigenous warlords continues to affect the U.S. Government's strategic objective of bringing stability to key regions that support our national interests.

***The Krayola Khans***

Given this recent experience in Somalia, the reader's attention is now drawn to the current challenges a JFC faces in Afghanistan—a country renowned for its warlords. Below are biographical sketches of three such warlords, each of whom presents a unique challenge to the JFC's mission to establish the secure environment required for long-term stability within the country. Each man was selected for this analysis due to his distinct characteristics, which will provide the reader with a broad spectrum of the types of warlords JFCs face while conducting campaigns or major operations in failed or failing states. *The purpose of these bio-sketches is to present useful categorizations of warlord behavior/motivations in order to demonstrate that it is not "one size fits all" and to provide a starting point for analysis.*



**Marshal Fahim Khan**

Mohammad Qasim Fahim Khan represents the type of warlord that has assumed a quasi-legitimate role at the highest levels of government due to his extensive power base.

Fahim, an ethnic Tajik, is both intelligent (an alumnus of the Kabul University) and a fierce warrior, having participated in fierce battles against the Soviets, Afghan warlords, and the Taliban.<sup>7</sup> Upon the assassination of Ahmed Shah Mahsood on September 9<sup>th</sup> 2001, Fahim assumed the role of head of the Northern Alliance.<sup>8</sup> In his book, *American Soldier*, General Tommy Franks, who at that point commanded U.S. CENTCOM, discusses meeting with Fahim in order to secure his assistance in bringing down the Taliban. As Fahim departed the meeting he was given duffle bags of U.S. currency as inducement to meet his promise of assistance.<sup>9</sup>

After the defeat of the Taliban, the United States and several other nations met in Germany to assist in the establishment of the Interim Government for Afghanistan. At Bonn, it was decided that Fahim would become the Minister of Defense and Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, would become the interim president.<sup>10</sup> Those who served in Kabul readily understood the lack of affection between the two, and Fahim's own desire for power.<sup>11</sup>

Just prior to the 2004 Afghan Presidential elections, Karzai dropped Fahim as a running mate and after the elections he dismissed him as the Defense Minister. Today, although not within the central government, Fahim still represents a formidable figure given both his sizable cash flow (allegedly from illegal trade in gems) and his large militia, which has yet to demobilize.<sup>12</sup>

**Ismail Khan**

Ismail Khan, represents the type of warlord that operates at the sub-national or regional level. “The Lion of Herat,” earned his title through his aggressive fight for control of the western portion of Afghanistan, initially against the Soviets and then against factional warlords.<sup>13</sup> Finally, Ismail and his forces, working along side the U.S. military, defeated the Taliban in western Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup> He then assumed his role as the governor of Herat.<sup>15</sup>

In 2004, militia commanders in the surrounding provinces began to challenge Ismail’s control of the area. Then, in February 2004, Ismail’s son was killed in Herat during a firefight with a local militia commander, leading to the deployment of 1000 soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to Herat. Shortly thereafter, sub-warlords in the *Bagdis* province to the north and *Ghowr* province to the east began to conduct raids against commanders loyal to Ismail. Lastly, in August 2004, a bitter rival from the *Shindand* region began a fierce battle with Ismail’s forces, with both sides bringing tanks into the fight.<sup>16</sup> After a second major deployment of the ANA brought a cessation to the hostilities, President Karzai installed a new governor in Herat. Ismail was then moved to Kabul and given a nominal post in the central government.<sup>17</sup> Although no longer recognized as the governor of Herat, Ismail’s presence and influence remains strong in the area. Ismail’s source of power comes from his still loyal private militia, his access to funds garnered from the siphoning of customs revenues, and his possible control of drugs flowing through the region.<sup>18</sup>

### Pacha Khan Zadran



Pacha Khan Zadran represents the type of warlord that operates on the periphery—sometimes working with and sometimes against the government. He has been called “the iron grandpa” and resides in the contentious area along Afghanistan’s southeastern border with Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> Pacha, like Fahim and Ismail, fought the Soviets, fellow Afghan warlords, and then the Taliban. Although Pacha was a strong supporter of the United States in the effort to defeat the Taliban, he has since had a turbulent relationship with both the U.S. and Afghan governments.<sup>20</sup> In December 2003 he was captured by the Pakistanis and turned over to the U.S. He was later released under “implied control,” demanding that he return to Kabul on a monthly basis and report to a designated U.S. military representative.<sup>21</sup> Although he initially did so, today his cooperation is marginal. Pacha’s source of power comes from his strong tribal affiliation, his band of militiamen, and his access to cash through the operation of illegal checkpoints and taxation of local Afghans.<sup>22</sup>

### *Facets of Operational Art: Termination, Center of Gravity, and Leverage*

Using the three examples of warlord types noted above (national, sub-national, and peripheral), the author will now expand upon the thesis of this paper: *by employing three facets of operational art: center of gravity, leverage, and termination, JFCs can effectively deal with indigenous warlords during Military Operations Other Than War.*

### Termination

The first facet of operational art to be addressed is that of **termination**. The purpose for doing so is to propose that dealing with powerful indigenous warlords is similar to that of planning for war, where Clausewitz advises, “...not to take the first step without considering

the last.”<sup>23</sup> As JFCs seek to secure and stabilize a given region they must first consider the desired end state for the overall mission. While the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” may work well in the heat of battle, once the fighting is over you may find yourself in a rather uncomfortable relationship. A case in point was Afghanistan’s General Rashid Dostum’s much-publicized abuse of prisoners after the defeat of the Taliban.<sup>24</sup> This paints a clear picture that JFCs must delicately weigh whom they choose to engage with in the mission to both win the war and the peace thereafter.

In the case of Afghanistan—our initial mission was to overthrow the Taliban regime and work with the international community to establish a free and democratic state. History has shown that Afghanistan has rarely, if ever, been ruled from the capital. Traditionally, whoever ruled in Kabul did so with the aid of regional tribal leaders.<sup>25</sup> When the Taliban regime was ousted from power, the Bonn Agreements installed an interim government in order to maintain the fragile peace. This transitional government presented an unusual blend of actors—many of who had been at war with each other after the Soviet withdrawal from the country in 1989.

To focus on the facet of termination, then, the JFC must consider the end state as he builds his plan to stabilize the region upon the cessation of hostilities. In looking at our khans, the JFC was presented with three men who affected his operational mission, each at a different level. In the case of the newly dubbed “Marshal” Fahim Khan, he had a man who was part of the internationally recognized central government. Although the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had control of the capital, in fact Fahim ruled the streets of Kabul with his private army from the *Panjshir* valley.<sup>26</sup> In Ismail Khan, he had a warlord-governor, who for all intents and purposes was out of reach, as no U.S. forces were

operating in Western Afghanistan and the Afghan National Army was still in its infancy. And in Pacha Khan, he had what had been an ally, but became—as power was being divvied up—a warlord who began to aggressively engage any force (to include U.S.) that challenged his unofficial rule.<sup>27</sup> So, how was the JFC to deal with this situation?

The JFC must first determine the end state and how that particular warlord fits into the picture. He must recognize the sensitivity of the situation, but determine—in conjunction with the U.S. Ambassador and host government—a long-term game plan designed to either bring the warlord “into the fold” or minimize his negative effect within the country. With this end state in mind, let us examine how the JFC designed a termination plan to affect each of the Afghan warlords.

In the case of Fahim, the JFC had one of the most powerful warlords in the country, whose army was de facto holding the capital hostage. By initially working with Fahim and acknowledging his position within the government, the JFC was able to secure his cooperation and place enough pressure on him to begin reducing his forces within the city. In the case of Ismail Khan, the JFC recognized it would be months, if not years, before the situation became stabilized enough to take on the problems in western Afghanistan. However, by working with the Afghan president and American ambassador, Ismail Khan was removed from his position as governor. Although he still maintained a powerful influence in Herat, his removal set the stage to begin reducing his power base. Lastly, with Pacha Khan, the JFC needed to minimize his negative impact in an extremely volatile area. While Pacha would not be a major player at the national level, he still represented a significant obstacle to U.S. success along the hostile border with Pakistan. After Pacha was arrested and turned over to the U.S., the JFC deemed it an effective strategy to bring him “into the fold.” As

such, Pacha was directed to report to the JFC's headquarters once per month to discuss affairs in his region.<sup>28</sup> Further, his militia continues to work with U.S. government agencies as they seek out al Qaeda insurgents who cross the porous boarder in the Gardez region.<sup>29</sup> Recognizing Pacha's erratic nature, but the lack of ability to exert enough pressure on him until the new Afghan Army is ready to take the lead, the JFC balanced today's need for Pacha's help with tomorrow's necessity to remove his negative influence.

Once the JFC has made a determination with regards to the warlord's role, he must then determine how to affect leverage over him. To do this, he must tackle the next facet—identifying the warlord's center of gravity.

### **Center of Gravity**

As the JFC seeks to bring stability to the area of operations, he is faced with warlords who have a number of advantages in their favor. These men know the lay of the land and use their militia to control a portion of the population. The warlord has typically operated in the area for some time and in many cases can be seen by some as a hero—defender of both his people and their lands. To complicate matters to an even greater degree, the warlord may have been an integral part of the U.S. Coalition that defeated our mutual enemy.

As the JFC begins to stabilize the region, the warlord has the capacity to affect the mission, either positively or negatively. Many of these men are astute enough to know the power and influence they wield, and have survived long enough to use it to their advantage. A case in point was Fahim's ability to use his position as the head of the Northern Alliance to assume the role of both Minister of Defense and First Vice-President. Upon the defeat of the Taliban, Ismail Khan reasserted himself as the "Emir of Herat." And Pacha Khan used his militia to initially secure his self-proclaimed seat as "governor" of Paktia province.<sup>30</sup> Yet

each of these men, after securing their seats of power, fell out of favor and have hindered the JFC's efforts to stabilize the country.<sup>31</sup>

In order to effectively neutralize the negative impact of the warlord, the JFC must first identify his center of gravity. But what exactly is the center of gravity for an indigenous warlord and how do you identify it? To begin with, we must first look at several definitions of center of gravity and determine what fits best in this case. Joint Publication 3.0 states the center of gravity is: "Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."<sup>32</sup> If we refer to Carl von Clausewitz's classic *On War*, he states the center of gravity is, "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."<sup>33</sup> Lastly, in their article titled *Center of Gravity; What Clausewitz Really Meant*, Joseph Strange and Richard Iron argue "Clausewitz meant center of gravity as the main strength of an enemy," and that the "center of gravity is relevant only in relation to an enemy."<sup>34</sup>

In this case, with the "hub of all power" as the basis, then the center of gravity of the warlord would be the militia that he controls. By removing the militia, the JFC has removed the means by which the warlord can influence the operation. However, due to the complex nature of MOOTW, determining how to attack this center of gravity—the militia—is the true test of operational art. To do so, the JFC must conduct a detailed analysis of the warlord and his militia, looking for critical strengths and weaknesses. His analysis should focus on those "weaknesses or their elements that are especially vulnerable to physical attack or other actions—diplomatic, informational, economic, etc." which "will become *critical vulnerabilities*."<sup>35</sup> It is important to note that each warlord's critical vulnerability (CV) will not exactly mirror that of another. The JFC and his staff must be careful to not transpose the

CV from one warlord to the other, using a “cookie cutter” approach, as each warlord may in fact have his own distinct means to control his militia.

In looking at the three examples of Afghan warlords, each may be considered to have their own separate critical vulnerability. The author will *postulate* on possible CVs for each—although due to the lack of the required detailed intelligence it will be just that, a hypothesis of a possible critical vulnerability. *For the purpose of this paper—what is relevant is the concept of identifying the CV and using it to affect the desired outcome.*

Based upon the biographical sketches provided at the outset of this paper, one could surmise that the critical vulnerability for each of the warlords is based around his control of a significant armed militia. Therefore, attacking the means by which he controls his militia will diminish his power. But what are the means by which a warlord controls his militia? It may be that the tie between the warlord and his militia is based upon their personal loyalty to him, and only the removal of their arms will cause them to disband. Alternatively, if the loyalty of the militia is directly tied to the pay they receive, and the lack of available funds would cause the militiamen to leave in order to find employment elsewhere, then the CV would be the warlord’s access to his funds. Lastly, if his control is based upon the position he holds within his tribal network, one could then deduce his CV to be the bond he has with the tribe. Of the three CV’s listed above, the last could be the most difficult to attack, as it is seated in centuries of culture.

Given the three CV’s listed above; arms, funds, and tribal bonds, the JFC must next determine the best means to place leverage against the center of gravity in order to achieve his operational objective. This leads us to the last of the three facets to be discussed: leverage.



## **Leverage**

Joint Publication 3-0 defines **leverage** as: “gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions.” Further, it states that leverage is “the centerpiece of joint operational art.”<sup>36</sup> While the focus of this definition is primarily on war fighting, the author proposes that in MOOTW the JFC’s leverage could span the full spectrum of United States power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). And given the complexities involved in these environments, in some cases the commander may in fact require the use of all of these elements to place effective leverage on a warlord. Using the three postulated CVs noted above, the author will offer possible means of placing leverage on each to affect the operational objective.

The first CV to be discussed is that of the militia’s weapons. For the purpose of this paper, the author will propose that this is Fahim’s critical vulnerability. With the operational objective of removing Fahim’s power base and minimizing his forces from affecting the long-term stability of Afghanistan, the JFC must place leverage against the militia’s control of their weapons. Removing the militia’s arms will require a two-pronged approach: the use of diplomacy and the military. The diplomacy prong would leverage the advantages that the United Nations brings to the table; the multi-national ISAF and the Demobilization, Demilitarization, and Reintegration (DDR) program funded by Japan and executed by United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA).<sup>37</sup> By establishing a clearly defined timeline and implementation plan for the DDR program, tied to the building of the new Afghan Army, the JFC can begin to whittle away at the militia. The first step would be to remove the heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, air defense artillery), followed by a rewards program for the turning in of small arms (crew served and individual weapons). While this

may sound easy and straightforward, in countries where we are likely to conduct MOOTW (like Afghanistan) it is probable that they have been at war for some time and will not turn in their arms willingly. This is where the second prong comes in to play: the use of the military.

A key component to the decision as to which military force to use (U.S./Coalition or host country) is the timeline required to achieve the operational objective. If the timeline is relatively short due to either domestic or international pressure, the JFC may be required to use U.S./Coalition forces to affect the required pressure on the warlord's militia to DDR. However, if time permits, it may be best to use the host government's recognized national army to achieve this end. In the case of the Afghan Army, the JFC must weigh the sensitivity of the situation. If the use of the newly trained army to remove weapons by force would present a negative image in the eyes of the local population, it may be best to have them in a supporting role instead. Conversely, if using the new army to conduct this mission will present them as a strong and capable force and win the respect of the population at large, then the use of the indigenous national army makes most sense. While demobilizing the militia, the JFC must closely monitor the warlord's actions—if he was wrong in his analysis of the critical vulnerability, he must reassess and develop a new plan based upon the new possible CV. Given the subjective nature of this analysis, the commander may in fact find himself developing and implementing numerous plans for each warlord.

In the case of Ismail Khan, the author will propose that his militia's loyalty is tied to their next paycheck and therefore the CV is his source of revenue, to include the funds he receives from illegal drug trade. With this as a critical vulnerability, the JFC must place leverage on removing the funds he receives from trafficking in illegal drugs. To exert the required leverage on drug trafficking and thereby attack this warlord's CV, the JFC must

integrate all elements of the DIME. First, diplomatically he must work with the United Kingdom, as the Bonn Agreements have given them the lead for counter-narcotics operations.<sup>38</sup> Second, he must use information operations in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan to ensure the farmers who grow the poppies understand this is now considered an illegal act (formerly the growing of poppies was condoned by the Taliban and used as a source of funding the war).<sup>39</sup> Next, the operational commander will require the use of the military to support the mission to shut down drug trafficking routes throughout the country. As in the previous case, the JFC must carefully weigh the benefits against the costs of using the newly created army in this mission. Lastly, the JFC must work with the international community to develop alternative crops for the farmers. By providing the means (seeds) and the ends (a guaranteed market equal to the current rate the farmers receive for their poppy crop), the farmers may be induced to not grow the crop that sustains the warlord's source of power.

Using each of these elements, the JFC will conceivably have attacked the critical vulnerability of the warlord (his funds) and thus reduced his source of power (the militia). As in the previous case, the JFC must carefully weigh the results of the plan to ensure it has achieved the desired effect. If not, he will have to reassess to determine if he has misjudged the CV or if it has changed. If the critical vulnerability was in fact the tribal affiliation of the warlord, this presents a whole new set of problems and is the source of our next subject.

The last critical vulnerability to be discussed is the tribal bond a warlord uses to control his militia. The author will propose this is Pacha Khan's CV and that his militia serves him out of tribal loyalty. In places like Afghanistan, the vast networks of family, clan, and tribal ties present a unique challenge to the JFC. These closed societies serve as the

foundation for the everyday life of tribal members. Cultural idiosyncrasies like the Pashtun tribe's *Pushtanwali*, the strict code of behavior involving the tenets of hospitality (*melmastia*), revenge (*badal*), and honor (*nang*), present the commander with an unusual challenge in developing the means to place leverage against the warlord.<sup>40</sup> In order to do so, the JFC must work closely with the Afghan government, both at the national and local level, to offset the source of power of the warlord—the people he leads and the cultural ties that bind them to their leader.

With the tribal affiliation and their support of the warlord as the critical vulnerability, the JFC must develop a plan that will attack the warlord without appearing to be attacking the tribe itself. In this particular case, the use of information operations will be one of the keys to success. The JFC must seek to drive a wedge between the warlord and his people. The possibility exists that there may be a rival leader within the clan or tribe readily available, and simply removing the warlord may allow the rival to take his place. Or, through information operations with the local and national government, the JFC may be able to present the image of the warlord as a dishonorable man whose actions are negatively affecting his people. Using this tactic and local knowledge of the tribal hierarchy, the JFC could possibly create the opportunity for someone else to step in as the new leader. The difference in this instance from the previous is that there was not a ready-made rival in place—so the JFC would have to set the conditions to make one. As in the last two cases, the JFC must closely assess the impact of his plan and adjust if he has misjudged the warlord's CV, or if the plan is having a negative second and third order of affect.

**Alternatively**

At the onset of the mission, the JFC must determine what role the warlords have in the overall scheme. He must then influence each warlord's center of gravity and, using the elements of national power, exert pressure on the critical vulnerability to achieve the objective—a secure environment from which to build long-term stability. But, given the problems we have faced with warlords in the past, should the U.S. military be tasked with this type of mission? There are some within both the U.S. Government and international community who would argue that it is not the place of the JFC to focus his energies on indigenous warlords, that by doing so we are kicking a “bee’s nest.” They would argue that by meddling in the internal affairs of foreign states, whether they are failed states or not, will only lead to ill outcomes. Political/military tragedies like Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia stand in testimonial to their argument. Further, these examples illustrate the U.S. public has little stomach for losing its sons and daughters in far off places, especially places that appear to have little to do with the national interests of the United States.

However, this argument fails to recognize that the United States, due to its leadership role, will continue to be required to respond to MOOTW in order to secure our long-term national interests. Further, as stated so eloquently by Larry Cable in *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, “While often distasteful, intervention is a legitimate diplomatic tool, and without it the United States would be impaired in its search for that most precious of international commodities, influence.”<sup>41</sup> Allowing countries like Afghanistan under the Taliban to dissolve into anarchy can have a devastating impact on the United States—the attacks on New York’s twin towers and the Pentagon stand in memorial to the position that we must develop a comprehensive doctrine to bring long-term stability to these failed states.

**Conclusion**

Military Operations Other Than War present the Joint Force Commander with a number of unique challenges, one of which is dealing with indigenous warlords. In the course of this paper the reader has been introduced to the concept of warlords, provided an example of how they have negatively effected U.S. operational commanders in the past, and seen how they are influencing current operations today. Lastly, the reader has been presented with a concept for employing three key facets of operational art—center of gravity, leverage, and termination—to positively affect the outcome of the JFC’s operational objective. By focusing on these facets, the JFC can identify and neutralize the warlords’ center of gravity, place concentrated and coordinated leverage over the warlord’s ability to command and control his forces, and develop a comprehensive termination plan that will counter the warlord’s negative impact on the mission.

As the United States conducts operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, sub-national actors in those countries will continue to challenge JFCs. Further, with future operations in failed or failing states on the horizon, such as Sudan’s Darfur region, the United States military must become more effective at dealing with warlords. As we have seen in Somalia, our failure to both recognize the capabilities of these warlords and to develop a comprehensive plan to offset or neutralize them can have a devastating impact on U.S. forces and the overall mission. By employing the facets of center of gravity, leverage, and termination when dealing with indigenous warlords during complex MOOTW missions, the operational commander can effectively deal with indigenous warlords and bring about security and long-term stability to those troubled lands.

## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this paper, the term “JFC” means the overall operational-level commander who controls a given theater, such as COMCFC-A for Afghanistan.

<sup>2</sup> JTF IM Multi-Service tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Washington, DC: April 1999) IV-4 and TACSOP53<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, “53D SPT BN Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Standing Operating Procedures (SOP),” (St. Petersburg, FL: 01 March 2002), Annex D.

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), III-10

<sup>4</sup> Wikipedia contributors, “Warlord,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia

<<http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Warlord&oldid=45367559>> [March 26, 2006]

<sup>5</sup> C.T. Evans and R. Snyder, “Operation Restore Hope/Battle of Mogadishu,” History 135: August 2001 <<http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/Somalia93.html#background>> [12 March 2006]

<sup>6</sup> Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: a story of modern warfare (New York, Penguin Books 2002)

<sup>7</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, “Military: General Mohammad Qasim Fahim,” 27-04-2005 17:30:17 Zulu <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/fahim.htm>> [08 March 2006]

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York, Regan Books 2004) 313

<sup>10</sup> Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2003), 348.

<sup>11</sup> Mark Sedra, “Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,” Bonn International Center for Conversion (Bonn, BICC: 2002), 20.

<sup>12</sup> Barnett R. Rubin, “Central Asia Wars and Ethnic Conflicts – Rebuilding Failed States,” United Nations Development Program HDR 2004: (n.p.: November 2004), 18-19.

<[http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:6ospbh70Nq8J:hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background\\_papers/2004/HDR2004\\_Barnett\\_Rubin.pdf+Marshal+Fahim+polish+gems&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2](http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:6ospbh70Nq8J:hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/2004/HDR2004_Barnett_Rubin.pdf+Marshal+Fahim+polish+gems&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2)> and Tanya Goudsouzian, “Afghanistan’s Emeralds,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 November 2002 <<http://www.afgha.com/?af=article&sid=28658>> [26 March 2006]

<sup>13</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, “Military: General Mohammad Ismail Khan,” 08-07-2005 23:32:41 Zulu <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ismail.htm>> [08 March 2006]

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Andrea Stone, “Afghan Governor de facto Ruler in West ‘Warlords’ Like Him Hold the Fate of the Central Government,” The New York Times 19 December 2002

<<http://www.eariana.com/ariana/ariana.nsf/allDocsArticles/25EFF7488171A06987256C9500589E11?OpenDocument>> [26 March 2006]

<sup>16</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, “Military: General Mohammad Ismail Khan,” 08-07-2005 23:32:41 Zulu

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ismail.htm>> [08 March 2006] Additionally, the author was assigned as the senior US adviser to the Afghan National Army deployed to Herat, then Bagdis and Ghawr provinces. Ten days prior to departing Afghanistan, the author and his team of advisors were once again deployed to the West to intervene between the two warring factions. During the Spring and Summer of 2004 the author submitted numerous situation reports on the volatility of the region and the rising power of sub-warlords around Herat with the intent to overthrow Ismail Khan’s control of the region.

<sup>17</sup> Jake Sherman, “Disarming Afghan Warlords,” PRAXIS: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security Volume XX: 2005, 10

<sup>18</sup> “Profile: Ismail Khan,” BBC News: 13 September 2004,

<[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/2535261.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2535261.stm)> [26 March 2006]. Additionally, members of the authors task force, operating with the ANA, captured substantial quantities of drugs being transported by Afghan militia known to be affiliated with Ismail Khan. Although the proof was circumstantial, those who have operated in the region clearly understood that nothing took place without the tacit approval of Ismail Khan.

<sup>19</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, “Military: General Pacha Khan Zadran,” 27-04-2005 17:31:03 Zulu

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/zadran.htm>> [08 March 2006]

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- <sup>20</sup> Brian Bennett, "Can Your Friend's Enemy Be Your Friend?," *Time*, (26 March 2002): <<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,344141,00.html>> [08 March 2006]
- <sup>21</sup> Christopher Costa, Student—College of Naval Warfare, Naval War College, interview by author, 10 March 2006, notes, Naval Station Newport, Building 444, Newport, R.I.
- <sup>22</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, "Military: General Pacha Khan Zadran," 27-04-2005 17:31:03 Zulu <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/zadran.htm>> [08 March 2006]
- <sup>23</sup> Michael Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London, Cass 2004), 303.
- <sup>24</sup> Babak Dehghanpisheh, John Barry and Roy Gutman, "The Death Convoy of Afghanistan," *Newsweek*, 26 August 2002 <<http://www.rawa.org/na-killings.htm>> [12 March 2006]
- <sup>25</sup> Amalendu Misra, *Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence* (Malden, MA: Polity Press 2004), 38-39.
- <sup>26</sup> Rubin, HDR 2004, 18-19  
<[http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:6ospb70Nq8J:hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background\\_papers/2004/HDR2004\\_Barnett\\_Rubin.pdf+Marshal+Fahim+polish+gems&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2](http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:6ospb70Nq8J:hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/2004/HDR2004_Barnett_Rubin.pdf+Marshal+Fahim+polish+gems&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2)>
- <sup>27</sup> Bennett, *Time*, n.p.
- <sup>28</sup> Costa.
- <sup>29</sup> Bennett, *Time*, n.p.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, n.p.
- <sup>31</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, "Afghanistan: Continuing Challenges," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong, 2d session (12 May 2004), 1.
- <sup>32</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), III-22
- <sup>33</sup> Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. *Carl Von Clausewitz On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984), 595.
- <sup>34</sup> Joseph Strange and Richard Iron, "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 35 (2005) 24.
- <sup>35</sup> Milan Vego, *Operational Warfare* (NWC: Newport, RI 2000), 307.
- <sup>36</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), III-14.
- <sup>37</sup> Mark Sedra, "Security First: Afghanistan's Security Sector Reform Process," *The Ploughshares Monitor* Volume 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003) <<http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mond03a.htm>> [26 March 2006], n.p.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> Kevin O'Connell, "A Total War on Drug Cartels," *USAWC Strategy and Research Project* (Carlisle, PA: 18 March 2005), n.p. << <https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil37.pdf>>> [26 March 2006]
- <sup>40</sup> Schofield, *Afghan Frontier*, 116.
- <sup>41</sup> Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1993): 260.



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